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The economics of air pollution from fossil fuels1 
David Newbery 
Energy Policy Research Group 
University of Cambridge 
3 May 2017 
1. Introduction 
Environmental quality, and notably the global climate, are said to suffer from the 
“tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968) – what is owned by everyone is looked after by 
no-one and the free market will fail to deliver the right environmental outcomes - there is 
a market failure. Clean air and concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs, which cause 
global climate change) are public goods, in that if they are provided for one, they are 
available for all, and will be undersupplied by the free market. If we are to assess these 
claims and their implications for good energy and environmental policy, we need to 
probe more deeply in what economics has to say about markets, market failure and public 
goods, and the remedies that have been proposed. 
 
Figure 1 Sources of UK Greenhouse gas emissions 1970-2016 
Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/provisional-uk-greenhouse-gas-emissions-
national-statistics-2016  
                                                 
1 This paper was stimulated by the project In Search of ‘Good’ Energy Policy: A multi-
disciplinary approach to energy and climate problems. I am indebted to David Spiegelhalter for 
information about the health impacts of air pollution and Robert Ritz for comments. 
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Air pollution and greenhouse gases are primarily caused by burning fossil fuels, 
although agriculture is responsible for a significant share of the total GHG emissions, 
primarily from other GHGs than CO2, as figure 1 shows.2 Figure 2 charts the rapid fall in 
all these air pollutants from 1990, with the exception of ammonia (NH3), about one-third 
of which comes from agriculture. 
 
Figure 2 Index of emissions of UK air pollutants, 1970-2014 
Source: http://naei.defra.gov.uk/data/data-selector?view=air-pollutants  
 
Economics is justly proud of its contributions to the understanding of markets and 
their properties. This paper sets out conditions under which markets work well at 
allocating resources efficiently, why markets can fail to deliver efficiency, and what 
remedies are available for their improvement. There is no guarantee that markets will 
deliver outcomes that are considered fair, just or equitable, and an important branch of 
economics is concerned with issues of distributional justice. In a well-ordered utopia, 
policy instruments would the targeted at specific problems. The budget would design tax 
and expenditure policies to deliver the best feasible social outcome. Specific policies 
would address specific market failures, concentrating on what well-functioning markets 
can deliver, which is efficiency. Issues of equity and fairness are best left to the budget 
and can be ignored when designing energy and environmental policy. While this may 
seem utopian, it remains a useful guide to policy design, departures from which need 
careful justification. 
                                                 
2 LULUCF is Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry and if absorbing carbon is negative 
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Much of the rest of the paper considers particular examples, starting with the 
problem of air pollution, the Clean Air Act, 1956, and subsequent attempts to quantify the 
impact and costs of road traffic pollution. The last part considers policies to mitigate 
damaging climate change, and the role and limitations of the EU Emissions Trading 
System in internalizing the external damage of greenhouse gas emissions. 
2. The role and limitations of competitive markets 
In their definitive text on General Competitive Analysis, Arrow and Hahn (1971) open 
with “There is by now a long and fairly imposing line of economists from Adam Smith to 
the present who have sought to show that a decentralized economy motivated by self-
interest and guided by price signals could be compatible with a coherent disposition of 
economic resources that could be regarded, in a well-defined sense, as superior to a large 
class of alternative dispositions.”  
The sense in which this general competitive equilibrium is superior needs careful 
interpretation. A competitive equilibrium can be shown to be efficient (strictly, Pareto 
efficient) under restrictive assumptions: a complete set of markets, all agents have full 
information about all prices, and there are no transactions costs. Pareto efficiency means 
there is no other feasible allocation of goods in which no-one is worse off and at least one 
person is better off. With additional assumptions on production technologies, Arrow and 
Debreu (1954) proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium, ensuring that the 
claims of competitive equilibrium are not vacuous. 
Several points need to be made. The particular competitive equilibrium depends 
on the allocation of endowments – the wealth, assets, skills, abilities and labour power of 
the agents – and there is no ethical reason to suppose that the resulting equilibrium is just. 
A reallocation of endowments would clearly make some agents worse off, but taxes on 
the rich to finance health-care for the many had been a step towards a more just society 
for most countries. The central theorem of welfare economics goes further, and argues 
that if these endowments could be costlessly reallocated, then different feasible equilibria 
could be generated, and, with some criterion for comparing them, the social optimum 
could then be supported as a competitive equilibrium. This would require the Benevolent 
Dictator to have perfect knowledge of all these endowments and then propose lump-sum 
taxes on, and transfers to, individuals. Lump-sum means that the amounts are 
independent of any actions taken by those individuals, whereas in practice taxes have to 
be based on observable attributes (e.g. property ownership) or actions (e.g. earning 
income, buying goods) of agents and as such likely distort choices. High taxes on goods 
reduce their demand; high income taxes reduce effort, encourage emigration or distort 
activities in the pursuit of ways of avoiding or reducing those taxes.  
Public economics is concerned with the informational and incentive problems of 
choosing tax and expenditure policies to reach the best feasible outcome – feasible in the 
sense of respecting both the constraints on resources and endowments, and the limits set 
by the information available to the tax authorities when levying taxes. Considerations of 
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equity and fairness are hugely important in almost all policy questions, and certainly in 
the design of good energy policy. The fact that the authorities are ultimately answerable 
to the electorate means that popular concepts of fairness may dominate those guiding 
more philosophically inclined welfare economists.  
One the key theorems in public economics is that in the absence of market failures 
and externalities, indirect taxes (i.e. taxes levied on goods and services, in contrast to 
direct taxes levied on income) should fall on final consumers and not distort production 
(Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971).3 A Value Added Tax on goods has this desirable property 
and is the recommended form of indirect taxation, to be supplemented by additional 
corrective taxes, discussed below. The force of these two theorems is that if market 
failures can be corrected, then the production side of the economy can be left to the free 
market. Market failures (potential market power) associated with natural monopolies may 
need regulation that mimics the operation of a competitive market to deliver efficiency, 
provided the costs of regulation are less than the costs of the market failure. (A natural 
monopoly arises where the least cost way of delivering a service is in a single firm, with 
the cost of supply the service from more than one competing firm materially greater.) 
Issues of equity and distributional justice are properly the subject of the tax and 
expenditure system (most redistribution derives from benefits such as health, education 
and pensions that are closer to equal for all, while most tax systems are roughly 
proportional, see e.g. Newbery, 1997). Under reasonable conditions indirect taxes should 
be uniform (Deaton and Stern, 1986) and so taxes on individual goods or sectors would 
not normally be appropriate vehicles for redistribution. That leaves the pursuit of 
efficiency at the sectoral level important in the very obvious sense that if a situation is 
inefficient, then in principle we could find a better alternative in which at least one person 
is better off and no-one is worse off. Apart from envy, what is not to like with that?  
This principle of Pareto optimality is more useful that might seem, for many 
regulatory changes are impeded because while they may lead to overall small gains, they 
often entail quite large individual gains and losses on participants. Environmental 
standards are frequently tightened, but they typically apply only to new purchases, 
notably for road vehicles, and if older vehicles are considered too polluting, they may be 
offered attractive terms for their replacement. When GHG emissions were subject to the 
EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) the firms covered by the scheme were allocated 
allowances based on their historic emissions, so that they would not be disadvantaged by 
the ETS (and many sector, notably the electricity generating sector, were able to pass on 
the price of the allowances and made a very substantial windfall profit, before they were 
required to buy allowances at auction). This principle of grandfathering existing rights 
                                                 
3 Strictly, there should be no pure profits or rents, or they should be taxed at 100%, otherwise the 
production side of the economy impacts on incomes, and may provide an additional way of taxing 
final incomes not otherwise available through direct taxation. In a modern capitalist economy 
with an efficient direct tax system this is unlikely to be material. 
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can reduce otherwise effective lobbying that would resist attempts to correct market 
failures. 
However, the conditions for market outcomes to be efficient are not only strong – 
no market manipulation or market power – but not immediately apparent from the list 
above.  
2.1. Market completeness and missing markets 
A complete set of markets means a market for every impact that affects well-being. A 
market for apples can provide my apple a day and keep the doctor away, but efficiency 
also needs a market for air quality, or a price on pollution, and, in the absence of 
government intervention, markets may fail to exist for such services. When my factory 
for making widgets emits smoke, or my car emits nitrogen oxides (NOx), I may not pay 
the cost of the damage that these inflict on others unless I am taxed, or required to meet 
optimal emission standards. The design of such taxes or standards represents a major area 
of economic analysis and policy discourse, and is a key concern of this chapter. 
Many such goods are public goods in that once produced for one person, they can 
be made available to others at no additional cost. If I make a radio or TV programme and 
then broadcast it to you, that broadcast could in principle be made available to everyone 
within range at no extra cost. If it is an excludable public good, I can restrict access to 
those who subscribe by encrypting it, and as a result charge for it, but many such goods, 
such as light houses, are not easily excludable and may need to rely on voluntary 
subscription, or public provision.  
Air pollution is a public bad in that sense, as victims cannot avoid their individual 
consequences by paying the polluter to restrict the pollution just to them and not to others 
in the locality. In such cases markets will either work imperfectly (for excludable public 
goods) or not at all, and other social mechanisms are needed. Pigou (1920) argued that 
producers will pursue their private interests, which, if they cause external damage 
(“externalities”), will not be aligned with the public interest (“social welfare”). The 
factory emitting smoke causes damage that harms its neighbours but, unless charged for 
that damage, will not take the cost-justified measures to reduce the damage. Similarly, 
bee-keepers manage hives to produce honey and beeswax, but their bees provide valuable 
pollination services to orchards and farmers. Unless compensated, these beneficial 
externalities risk being under-supplied. 
Pigou (1920) argued for a corrective “Pigovian” tax on damaging actions, or a 
corrective subsidy for beneficial externalities. These would correct the externality by 
aligning social and private costs and benefits and so internalize the externality. Producers 
would be incentivized to minimize all costs including, for example those from air 
pollutants and greenhouse gases, not just those paid for on markets. Producers of 
beneficial spill-overs, such as the learning-by-doing from deploying immature renewable 
energy, could be compensated and thereby encouraged to produce their efficient level. 
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A fuller analysis indicates that there is a “missing market” for the smoke, 
greenhouse gases or bee pollination services. Markets have two sides – a buyer who pays 
and a seller who charges for the good. Harmful externalities would require a negative 
price (i.e. a charge) on the emission of pollutants, and also a negative charge, i.e. a 
payment, to the “buyer” (recipient) of the pollutant, compensating for the damage 
suffered. Specifically, the payment would equal the marginal cost of the damage caused 
by the last unit of pollution received (which for greenhouse gases may be distant in time 
and space).  
Coase (1960) argued that Pigou had overlooked an important aspect of 
externalities, for if transaction costs were sufficiently low, the agent experiencing the 
externality (beneficial or harmful) would have an incentive to bargain with the agent 
producing that externality and reach a mutually better outcome. Almond orchards in 
California thus pay bee-keepers to locate their hives in the orchard to ensure pollination,4 
and selling bee pollination services seems well-established in many countries. 
Greenhouse gases may be taxed or priced on markets that have been created to rectify the 
missing market. 
In this bargaining approach, the allocation of well-defined property rights could 
be critical, ideally to the party that leads to the least transaction costs. The threat of a law 
suit, which requires unambiguous property rights, can then be effective in encouraging 
the offending party to negotiate. Thus the government may create clean air zones in 
which certain kinds of emission are prohibited, and restrict polluting activities to other 
locations. The local representative in a clean air zone then has a legal right to ban noxious 
emissions unless compensated, and may be able to negotiate a mutually satisfactory 
outcome, in a way that Coase (1960) envisaged. In criticizing Pigou, Coase was arguing 
for the decentralized solution of well-defined property rights and bargaining, against a 
centralized solution of government taxes, subsidies or regulation. Which option of tax or 
negotiation is better depends on relative transactions costs, which in turn depends (as 
with all tax solutions) on the cost of collecting, and the quality of, the information 
available to the agents making the decision (Farrell, 1987). 
Bilateral negotiations when both parties are well-informed ought to lead to 
efficient outcomes, but a lack of information, threats, bluff and a sense of injustice can 
hamper that process. Economists have studied this in the ultimatum game, in which one 
player offers a division of a reward, which the other can either accept or reject, but if 
rejected neither gets anything.  Experiments reveal that large deviations from a 50:50 
split are deemed unfair and are often rejected, even though both parties would be better 
off agreeing (Henrich et al., 2004; Oosterbeek et al., 2004). If more than a few need to 
reach agreement and cannot agree a leader to negotiate on their behalf, inefficiencies may 
again persist.  
                                                 
4 See e.g. http://www.pressreader.com/usa/porterville-recorder/20170213/281925952764811  
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Society may agree to set up authorities or governments with powers to tax, 
charge, regulate, finance or provide the public good, as a solution to such coordination 
difficulties. A compromise between the Pigovian and Coasian approach that might 
improve on each was suggested by Farrell (1987), who noted that “bumbling 
bureaucrats” might find it hard to determine the right corrective tax, while Coasian 
bargaining might fail to overcome transaction costs. The compromise is for the state to 
prescribe a reference or default standard and then allow agents to bargain away from that 
if mutually advantageous.  
This principle of opening central decisions to contestability by private agents (in 
this case allowing subsequent bargaining) can be a useful way of improving on the 
originally proposed solution. In Britain, connections to the electricity distribution system 
are subject to oversight by the regulatory agency, Ofgem, and covered by grid codes and 
standard connection agreements. The standard connection agreement is for firm access, in 
that once paid for, the holder has a right to deliver the contracted amount, and if the 
System Operator needs to curtail injections, the holder must be compensated for lost 
profit. The cost of providing that firm access, paid for by the generator, can be very high, 
and it may be much cheaper to use existing assets, but for a small fraction of the time to 
curtail injections. As a result of an interesting experiment (Anaya and Pollitt, 2015), the 
local distribution operator offered prospective windfarms the existing expensive 
connection option or a cheaper connection with guaranteed access for varying levels 
(94% or higher). These proved cost-effective and in the subsequent conference discussion 
of the trials, the regulator, Ofgem, and the generating companies were asked if there were 
any obstacles preventing this arrangement – to which the answer was no. 
2.2. The Clean Air Act, 1956 as an example 
The Great London Smog of 1952, which may have led to the premature deaths of 
between 4,000 and 12,000 people (Bell et al., 2004) came after nearly seven centuries of 
attempts to address the harmful effects of smoke inhalation (starting in 1273 when the use 
of coal was prohibited in London as being “prejudicial to health”,5 and, more actively in 
the 19th century with the Smoke Nuisance Abatement (Metropolis) Acts, 1853 and 1856). 
Until the mid-20th century, such air pollution was considered an inevitable by-product of 
industrial success,6 and the thrust of the Smoke Nuisance Abatement (Metropolis) Acts 
was to restrict emissions in (wealthier) populated areas while giving the right to pollute to 
industrial zones. Not surprisingly, given the westerly winds in the UK, West Ends 
became the smart addresses, and East Ends were occupied by the poor.  
Fouquet (2011, fig. 3) tracks the pollution concentration in London from 1800 
(when it started at 400 micrograms/m3 Total Suspended Particulates, TSP) to a peak of 
600 µg/m3 in 1890 before falling to just over 100 µg/m3 in 1950, just before the Great 
                                                 
5 http://www.air-quality.org.uk/02.php  
6 http://bfa-ba.blogspot.co.uk/2007/06/attitudes-to-pollution-in-united.html  
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Smog and then steadily down to below 50 µg/m3 by 1980.7  Even after considerable 
medical evidence of the harm of smoke and the development of a smokeless form of coal, 
“coalite”, invented by Thomas Parker in 1904,8 which provided a technical fix that could 
have avoided smog, there was a clear reluctance to impose effective clean air policies. In 
the context of current concerns over climate change and the need for carbon pricing it is 
useful to consider the obstacles to solving the clear and present danger posed by smog, 
First, coal burned in open grates gave immediate satisfaction to the users indoors, 
while the smoggy outdoors seemed an indirect consequence of each person’s actions that 
no single person could remedy. The cheery homely glow was a benefit that families 
would not give up lightly for the dreary alternative of burning coalite in an enclosed 
stove, so there was little public pressure for action, except in dramatic cases like the 
Great Smog. Second, smokeless fuel was more costly to users (certainly in cost per unit 
of useful energy, but also extra costs of investment in closed stoves, while the perceived 
quality of the fire was lower and hence less valued). The logical policy would be a 
Pigovian tax on dirty coal to raise its perceived cost above that of coalite (adjusting for 
their different characteristics). However, a tax on coal high enough to cover the marginal 
damage in densely populated urban areas would be excessive for suitably zoned industrial 
use. Differentiating the tax on different uses of coal was impractical, while creating 
smokeless zones seemed more targeted.  
Third, taxes are almost always politically unpopular, while standards that all have 
to obey can seem fairer, and have the merit that those experiencing them have an 
incentive to press for their wider extension. Thus after Germany enacted a Large 
Combustion Plant Ordinance (Grossfeuerungsanlagen-Verordnung or GFAVo) in June 
1983, the German government pressed for similar standards being adopted for the whole 
of Europe. The European Commission proposed a Large Combustion Plant Directive 
based on the GFAVo in December 1983 (Newbery, 1990; Berkhout et al., 1989). 
As a result, the Clean Air Act, 1956 left it to local authorities to declare smoke 
control zones within which burning non-smokeless fuels was prohibited. Only when 
natural gas from the North Sea arrived in quantities in the late 1970s and with it the rapid 
penetration of gas-fired central heating, was this problem adequately addressed. Figure 3 
(an amplification of figure 2) shows trends in emissions of various air pollutants since 
1970 as well as the growth in domestic consumption of natural gas, which has displaced 
coal in domestic heating, where the two series move in almost exact opposition.  
                                                 
7 The current EU Limit values for TSP (gravimetric method) per year are 150µg/m3 (EU Council 
Directive 80/779/EEC) – see http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/2-9167-057-X/page021.html. 
TSP includes particulates above PM10 up to 30+ microns. Delhi, one of the most polluted cities in 
the world, experienced TSP of 370 µg/m3, according to Fouquet (2011). WHO (2016) gives 2013 
values for Delhi as 239 µg/m3 for PM10 and 122 µg/m3 for PM2.5, reducing life expectancy by 
seven years (Spiegelhalter, 2017). London has 22 µg/m3 (PM10) and 15 µg/m3 PM2.5. 
8 by carbonizing coal at 640 degrees Celsius - see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coalite  
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Figure 3 UK air pollutant emissions, domestic natural gas consumption and diesel 
cars 
Source: Defra statistics at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/emissions-of-air-pollutants, 
Dept. of Transport Great Britain Transport Statistics, 2015 
 
Particulate emissions are now measured by particulate matter of less than 10 
microns (PM10) and less than 2.5 microns (PM2.5), although figure 2 shows the old 
measure of black smoke. Unfortunately the particulate data before 1970 are not readily 
available, but clearly the 40% drop in particulates (PM10 and PM2.5) in Figure 3 within 
the first decade after 1970 mirrors the rapid penetration of natural gas from almost zero to 
60% of its 2000 value (which is taken as 100). The implication for climate change 
mitigation is clear – if a suitably competitive zero-carbon alternative to fossil fuels can be 
developed, then decarbonizing will be much easier and more likely to succeed.  
In that context the switch from coal, first to natural gas and then increasingly to 
renewables has dramatically lowered the carbon intensity of electric generation in Britain 
from 1990 on, to the point where in 2016 coal was completely displaced in some periods 
for the first time in over a century. Figure 4 shows the recent squeezing of the share of 
coal in generation and by April 2017, there have been days with zero coal generation for 
the first time since power was first generated in the 1880s.. 
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Figure 4 The fall of coal and the growth of renewable electricity, 1998-2016 
Source: UK Digest of Energy Statistics, 2017 
 
2.3. Traffic-related air pollution 
Now that smog from domestic coal fires has largely ceased to be a problem with the rise 
in gas-fired central heating, attention has turned to the health impacts of road traffic. The 
Daily Mail (23/2/16) claimed9 “Lethal legacy of dash for diesel: Air pollution is ‘killing 
40,000 a year in the UK’”, taking the number of 40,000 from the Royal College of 
Physicians (2016).  Figure 3 shows the rapid rise in diesel cars since 1990. It had been 
widely appreciated for some time that compression ignition (diesel) engines emitted 
higher levels of particulates and NOx, and that these had serious health impacts,10 but 
steadily tightening standards, improvements in design lowering costs, and their greater 
fuel economy held out the promise that they could reduce transport CO2 emissions. 
The scandals which erupted in September 2015 when the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) accused Volkswagen of manipulating emissions data (so-called 
"dieselgate") cast doubt on the efficacy of laboratory measurements of vehicle emissions. 
Apparently heavy goods vehicles’ emissions are measured more accurately and as a result 
actually produce less damaging pollution than cars (ICCT, 2016). One obvious solution is 
to improve the accuracy of measurements, and possibly to adjust the annual road licence 
charge to reflect differences in emissions. The UK Government is now considering 
                                                 
9 At http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3459430/Lethal-legacy-dash-diesel-Air-pollution-
killing-40-000-year-UK.html  
10 The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution’s 18th report (RCEP, 1994) pointed to 
growing medical evidence from COMEAP, and COMEAP (1998). 
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allowing cities to create low emission zones or charge diesel vehicles for entering city 
centres – a policy already supported by the EU.11  
 
Figure 5 Air quality measures for UK 1987-2015 
Source: Defra statistics at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/517681/Ai
r_Quality_National_Statistic_2015_final.pdf   
Note: WHO (2016) computes PM2.5 for London as 15 μg/m3, 68% of the 22 μg/m3 PM10. 
 
The European Union’s agreed limit values for PM10 is for an annual average of 
less than 40 μg/m3, which figure 3 shows has been a struggle to meet in many urban 
areas. The UK has set new targets for PM2.5 of 25µg/m3 ‘cap’ for hotspots and a 15% 
reduction in PM 2.5 levels in all urban locations by 2020.12 Figure 3 shows that although 
the average roadside particulates (PM10) are falling, ozone, caused by nitrogen oxides, 
increasingly from diesel engines, is rising. So too are volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs), much of which is transported to the UK from the Continent. 
Spiegelhalter (2017) traces the sources of the claimed 40,000 deaths back to a 
series of studies of the health impact of air pollution. COMEAP (2010) summarizes 
evidence that a 10µg/m3 increase in PM2.5 increases the average risk of dying each year 
by 6%, while DEFRA (2015) estimated that a 10µg/m3 increase in NO2 would raise the 
risk of dying by 2.5% (but the two effects are not simply additive). As the average 
                                                 
11 http://urbanaccessregulations.eu/low-emission-zones-main  
12 http://www.environmental-protection.org.uk/policy-areas/air-quality/about-air-
pollution/particles/ Note the WHO target for PM2.5 is 10 µg/m3 – see 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs313/en/  
Annual levels of PM10 and Ozone UK 1987-2015
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exposure to PM2.5 in the whole of the UK (not just urban) is 9µg/m3 and as there are 
600,000 deaths per year, 9/10 x 6% x 600,000 = 32,400 deaths from particulates (the rest 
come from NO2, mostly from diesel vehicles, see DEFRA, 2015). Spiegelhalter (2017), 
endeavouring to increase public understanding, puts this in another light, citing the 
relative risk of air pollution as “very roughly, pro-rata, like an extra hour watching TV, 
being another 3 kg overweight, or having an extra drink …(or smoking) around 1.04 per 
cigarette per day”.  
One way of quantifying the damage of diesel emissions is to estimate the number 
of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) lost as a result of their emissions (Newbery, 
2005). Spiegelhalter (2017), using COMEAP (2015) estimates, gives the impact as 
340,000 Life-years lost as a result of the 7 month shortening of life expectancy from air 
pollution (not quality adjusted, which might reduce it as the impact will largely be on 
those who are already suffering from a decreased quality of life through poor 
cardiovascular health). NICE,13 the UK’s National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence, considers expenditures of £20-30,000/QALY to be justified in a cash-
strapped National Health Service, a figure that has not increased for many years. Deloitte 
(2009) updated the Department for Transport’s value of a prevented fatality (VPF) to just 
over £1.6 million, which, if the expected life years lost is 40, gives a higher QALY of 
£40,000.  
At £40,000/life year, the cost of UK PM2.5 pollution would be £13.6 billion/yr, 
but not all of this is attributable to transport pollution. Newbery (2005) estimated that in 
1999 perhaps 4.4 µg/m3 PM10 (perhaps 3 µg/m3 PM2.5) were attributable to road 
transport, since when figure 3 shows that particulates have fallen, ozone has risen, and 
diesel vehicles have increased by a factor of five (fig. 1). This is one third the total used 
to estimate 340,000 life years, so on that basis transport might be responsible for 115,000 
life years lost or £4.5 billion/yr. If 75% is attributable to the 30 bn litres/yr diesel used, 
the cost would be 15p/litre, whereas the excise tax on diesel in 2017 was 60p/litre, but 
part of that is for other pollutants, and a considerable part should be considered as a road 
user charge (Newbery, 2005; Newbery and Santos, 1999). Petrol, far less polluting, is 
equally taxed and so one cannot interpret some part as a corrective Pigovian tax. 
However, recent measurements outside the laboratory have shown wide variations 
between different vehicles with the same fuel consumption, and so a uniform increase in 
diesel would not differentiate between low and higher polluting vehicles. A combination 
of a higher excise on diesel, higher annual road fund license charges based on the 
model’s measured emissions (similar to differential license fees based on CO2 emissions), 
and entry charges to clean air zones again based on vehicle, could deliver a more targeted 
approach, as well as generating revenue to cover the cost of any scrappage scheme.  
 
                                                 
13 At https://www.nice.org.uk/advice/lgb10/chapter/judging-the-cost-effectiveness-of-public-
health-activities  
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3. Taxes, prices or standards? 
Most air pollutants impact a large number of individuals who are unlikely to negotiate 
directly with the polluter, and at best may lobby for public action. There are exceptions, 
and Börkey et al., (1998) report a private agreement between a Volvo plant and a British 
Petroleum refinery near Göteborg in Sweden in which the refinery paid Volvo to cover its 
car park and prevent corrosion from sulphur dioxide. Notably, other neighbours were not 
compensated. In the absence of problems of subsequent Coasian bargaining, there are 
three options for addressing pollution externalities. The first is a tax on the pollutant. This 
could be (most simply) on an observable precursor to the resulting emissions (e.g. 
sulphur in oil products that when burnt gives sulphur dioxide, SO2) but this does not 
encourage scrubbing to remove the SO2 from the emission stream. Taxing the emissions 
solves that problem and can work for point sources, but not for numerous mobile sources 
like vehicles where taxes on the sulphur content of road fuel have been effective 
(DEFRA, 2004). Setting the right tax on emissions for local air pollutants that have 
impacts downwind is difficult, as the marginal damage will depend on who and what is 
downstream (and will vary with weather and wind direction). 
The second alternative is to limit the total amount of emissions (nationally, as 
with SO2 and carbon dioxide, CO2) or regionally by airshed as for NOx in some countries 
(e.g. in California). Emission permits or allowances in total equal to the target can then be 
allocated or auctioned, and trading will establish a price that has the merit of encouraging 
the permits to be allocated efficiently to deliver the least-cost clean up via this “cap-and-
trade” mechanism. The US Clean Air Act, 1990 allocated permits to reach average annual 
emissions of 8.95 million tons per year over a period, with those allocated permits free to 
either bank them for future use or sell them now and purchase them later if needed. This 
delivered a price for emissions that encouraged the installation of desulphurization 
equipment (flue gas scrubbers), a rapid fall in their cost as a competitive market 
developed, and a shift to low-sulphur coal and oil, reflected in price differences in 
sulphur content, (Ellerman et al., 2003). The resulting auction price was less than 10% of 
some forecasts (Harrington et al., 1999). 
The last solution is to set a performance standard with penalties for non-
compliance. When there are millions of individual vehicles, it is impractical to charge 
each for their emissions, which vary with design and vintage, and, more worrying for any 
policy, may be hard to verify by simple testing, as “dieselgate” demonstrated. The 
standard economic objection to setting standards is that they will not deliver any given 
level of reduction at least cost, as some emitters will face a very high cost of reducing 
emissions which other emitters could have done at a fraction of the cost. This argument 
carried sufficient force for the US Environmental Protection Agency to switch from 
emissions standards to cap-and trade for SO2 and NOx, where there were a limited 
number of large combustion plants that could be closely monitored, but is unlikely to 
work for dispersed mobile sources like vehicles. 
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Taxes and charges or prices work by inducing polluters to demand less polluting 
equipment and creates a demand-pull in the market for innovation. Standards on e.g. the 
equipment suppliers (car manufacturers, power stations) create a supply-push for 
innovation that can be remarkably effective in driving down the costs of meeting the 
standards. DEFRA (2004) gives convincing evidence that the ex ante estimate of costs 
produced in consultations over setting standards appear to often considerably exceed the 
ex post actual costs. In the transport sector DEFRA evaluated nine policies whose ex ante 
estimate of costs ranged from £16.1 billion to £22.8 bn but whose ex post costs were 
estimated to be from £2-4 bn. In the electricity sector the ex ante total estimate ranged 
from £6-30 bn and ex post to about £2bn (DEFRA, 2004, p145). Similarly, Harrington et 
al., (1999) find a bias to over-estimating regulatory compliance costs, primarily as the 
induced technical progress was ignored and often substantial (inevitably, given that the 
rules for estimating compliance costs assume no technical innovation). 
Moreover the reductions achieved were substantial compared to business as usual. 
Policies in the UK reduced SO2 in road transport by 96% by 2001, and by 77% in 
electricity generation (largely through the switch to gas induced by favourable relative 
gas to coal prices). Policies reduced NOx by 36% in road transport and 58% in electricity 
generation, which also experienced a policy-driven reduction of 78% in PM10 (DEFRA, 
2004, p131). 
 With improving measures of the damage and abatement costs, the Government 
passes tighter abatement laws, increasingly on the basis of impact assessments (e.g. 
DEFRA, 2013). The response is likely to be to develop cheaper solutions (filters, 
scrubbers, smokeless fuel). The benefits need to be measured in terms of money, which 
presents challenges. Health benefits are normally measured by QALYs on the basis of 
which medical procedures and drugs are assessed by NICE. Similarly, accidents are often 
similarly measured or by the value of a fatality prevented (VFP). Both require a measure 
of a QALY or VFP, and there is a rich literature on both. Clearly, considerable ethical 
issues are needed in their measurement. In addition, the value of environmental impacts 
needs to be costed, either by the cost of restoration or the value to users and potential 
users, itself a whole sub-discipline of environmental economics (see e.g. GOS, 2010).  
3.1. Climate change mitigation 
Climate change “is the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen” (Stern, 
2007), not only because its solution requires agreement among a large fraction of the 
world’s nations, but they need to act now to prevent damage to future generations. While 
these future costs are uncertain, there is a very high probability that they greatly exceed 
the costs of efficient and coordinated mitigation. In one sense the market failure is simple 
– greenhouse gases (GHGs) are global stock pollutants, meaning that the damage done is 
the same wherever they are released, and GHGs persist for centuries. Indeed, the 
timescale for some impacts such as ocean warming is millennia; although at the other 
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extreme arctic sea ice may disappear within decades. That suggests that a single price 
regardless of the source of the release is sufficient to address the problem. Furthermore, a 
large fraction of GHGs come from burning carbon, and so taxing the carbon content of 
the fuel would be the simplest solution. Carbon capture and storage could then be 
credited with the carbon sequestered. Other GHGs and agriculture admittedly pose more 
difficult monitoring issues. However, only a few Nordic countries (with no coal) have 
imposed carbon taxes on fuels. The solution is therefore clear – to properly price GHGs – 
but the problem is that GHGs are either not priced at all or are subject to very low prices 
per tonne of CO2e (Dolphin et al., 2016 - low relative to any plausible estimate of the 
marginal damage done, e.g. as computed by EPA, 2016 or Stern, 2007).  
The fact that GHGs are persistent stock pollutants has a number of implications – 
the social cost of carbon (GHGs are measured by their carbon or CO2 equivalent, CO2e) 
depends not on the rate of release but on the total stock, which only changes slowly with 
emissions. That means that the social cost of carbon (measuring its damage) should not 
vary much with emissions, but only with the stock (and new information about future 
damage). In addition, actions to mitigate climate damage have to persist over long 
periods of time, and policies therefore may be slow to deliver the perceptible changes that 
an impatient public demands. The difficulty of action is exacerbated as the source of most 
of the problem, burning fossil fuels, takes place in highly durable equipment whose stock 
takes a long time to replace. Coal-fired power stations built now will likely last 50-60 
years, while inefficient housing stock may only be replaced 1% or less per year in 
advanced countries. Another implication of a stock pollutant with a low rate of absorption 
is that the cost of the damage done (the social cost of carbon) will increase over time at 
the social discount rate as the cost of future harm approaches. One of the better aspects of 
a ‘cap-and-trade’ system of auctioning allowances to emit that can be banked is that their 
expected future prices rise at the rate of interest, as a result of arbitrage – if their price is 
expected to rise faster than the cost of borrowing money, agents will borrow and but now, 
driving up their present price, while if not, agents will sell, bank the cash and wait until 
allowances are cheaper than their accumulated savings. Of course, information changes 
and with it the expected future and hence present price of allowances, so figure 6 below 
does not suggest that market prices follow this rule. 
In terms of global agreement, 142 Parties of the 197 Parties to the Convention on 
Climate Change (COP 21) had ratified by 5 October 2016, and hence the threshold for 
entry into force of the Paris Agreement was achieved.14 However, the agreement is 
voluntary, and currently falls far short of delivering sufficient, credible and binding 
agreements to take adequate action. Quite apart from the difficulty of reaching such a 
commitment, there is the difficult of determining a suitable price for carbon. Stern (2007) 
and US EPA (2016) both point out that the social cost of carbon today depends critically 
                                                 
14 http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php although the future status of the US under 
President Trump remains a major concern. 
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on three hard-to-measure parameters. The first is the social discount rate, where figures 
between about 1% and 5% have been proposed (e.g. Nordhaus, 2007). If damage can 
occur a century from now, the present value of £1 million 100 years hence discounting at 
5% is only £7,600, but discounting at 1% is £37,000, justifying substantially more current 
investment in mitigation. Second, the economic and social magnitude of the potential 
future damage is even harder to assess. More severe floods and crop failures are almost 
inevitable, but their implications for death, diseases, war, and mass migration are far less 
certain, but certainly possible and definitely very costly. Finally, there is the problematic 
ethics of weighing future impacts against the yardstick of current money (needed to 
assess the value of mitigation), even if we could predict how many future people would 
suffer how much equivalent loss in consumption.  
One simple and rather naïve approach is to assume that lives are equally valuable 
in a utilitarian sense, which has the implication that £1 reduction to a person enjoying a 
level c of consumption is worth n times as much as £1 reduction to a person enjoying nc 
consumption. This in turn has the implication that the social discount rate is just the rate 
of growth of consumption per head plus a small addition for the possibility of extinction, 
which is the way Stern (2007) came up with an estimate of 1.7%. Others, notably 
Weitzman (1998) and Gollier & Weitzman (2010) have correctly argued that this simple 
rule only applies if all consumption grows at the same rate, and if, plausibly, some 
experience far worse futures, or if there are small risks of catastrophic outcomes, then the 
social discount rate should be considerably reduced. 
Economists have made other important contributions to the understanding of 
policy choices for climate change mitigation, apart from the extensive, welfare-
economics based analysis of the social cost of carbon. A carbon price can be either 
delivered by fixing the quantity (the cap) and then trading, as in the EU Emissions 
Trading System (ETS) (2003/87/EC), or fixing the price through some form of carbon tax 
or charge, such as the Carbon Price Support introduced in the 2011 UK Budget (HMT, 
2011). The classic argument for setting a carbon price is based on Weitzman (1974), who 
noted that in the face of uncertainty, a price instrument (tax or charge) dominates a 
quantity instrument (a cap or quota) if the marginal benefit of reducing emissions is 
flatter than the marginal abatement cost schedule. The marginal damage of a tonne of 
CO₂ now is essentially the same as a tonne emitted in 10 years' time, as CO₂ is resident 
in the atmosphere and oceans for a century or more. Thus the marginal benefit of 
abatement is essentially flat in the rate of emissions, even if the marginal damage is 
steeply increasing in the stock of emissions (Grubb & Newbery, 2008). 
    Weitzman's original result was derived from a static model with uncertainty 
resolved immediately after abatement choices, and so only suitable for flow, not stock 
pollutants. It may be suitable for short-run operating decisions of existing capacity 
(whether to run coal or gas-fired plant more intensively), but is not well-suited to 
investment decisions in highly durable capacity. Nuclear and coal power stations have a 
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life of 60+ years, even if gas-fired plant and wind turbines have shorter (20+) year lives, 
periods that commit to significant lock-in of cumulative emissions and hence a lock-in to 
a higher and more damaging stock of greenhouse gases (GHGs). 
    To deal with these lock-in and stock effects, one needs an intertemporal model 
in which damage depends on the stock of pollutant, not the flow. Newbery (2016b) 
summarizes the research done to demonstrate that Weitzman’s original argument in 
favour of taxes rather than quotas for this case remains robust. The evidence of the EU 
ETS supports this, for after its launch in 2005, the EU Allowance price shown in Fig. 6 
rose rapidly to nearly €30/tonne CO2, before collapsing to zero by December, 2007, the 
end of the first period. Second period prices similarly rose to €30/tonne CO2, before 
collapsing as a result of increased targets for renewable energy and the global financial 
crisis. The ETS thus failed to give an appropriate long-term price signal. 
 
Figure 6 The EU Allowance price for CO2 in the EU Emissions Trading System 
Source: EEX 
 
Clearly, the ETS carbon price is neither adequate, credible nor durable, and a poor 
guide for durable investment decisions in generation. So why, given persuasive 
arguments, do most jurisdictions choose quotas like the ETS rather than taxes? The 
simple and persuasive explanation is that quotas can be handed out to the emitting 
companies, who would otherwise effectively block any attempt to tax their emissions, 
while the voting public, observing such free allocations, believes that they will therefore 
not increase the prices of the products of the emitting industries. In the case of electricity, 
the Emissions Allowance Price was immediately added to the cost of generating from 
fossil fuels, as the allowances had an opportunity cost – they could be sold if not used. 
Keppler and Cruciani (2010) estimated that generating companies made excess profits of 
€19 billion per year in Phase 1 of the ETS (2005-7). Fortunately, the EU moved to 
auctioning permits for the power sector in 2012, so that at least the revenues were 
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available and could be used to subsidize e.g. renewable energy, where subsidies are an 
efficient (Pigovian) compensation for learning spillovers (Newbery, 2017a, 2017b). 
4. Conclusions 
Economists are sometimes accused of being market fundamentalists, of wishing to get the 
government out of the market place, and not caring for the social and distributional 
impacts that markets may deliver. This paper attempts to set that misperception right. 
First, public finance and policy in general needs to choose instruments that are well-
targeted to deliver objectives. Intervening in markets is almost always less effective at 
delivering distributional justice than more direct methods (targeted public expenditures, 
such as health care, unemployment insurance, pensions, direct taxes). That leaves 
markets to be corrected for market failures, not as mechanisms for addressing poverty.  
There are exceptions to this rule, in that in an imperfect world of Manifesto 
pledges and the difficulties facing any tax reform, intervening in particular markets may 
be “third-best” ways of addressing public concerns – hence governments may ask 
regulators to address fuel poverty rather than leaving it to the government to address 
poverty. Indeed, natural monopolies, such as transmission and distribution (wires and 
pipes), by definition are cheaper to provide through one (regional) company than many 
competitive companies, and a direct implication of that is that their efficient price will not 
cover their full cost. The balance is collected by regulated tariffs, and is akin to a tax, and 
it is quite appropriate to consider the distributional impacts of such charges, while, as 
with all public finance decisions, balancing equity gains against efficiency losses. 
Economists do indeed have a well-developed theory of what a competitive market 
can and cannot achieve – under restrictive conditions (market completeness) it can 
deliver efficiency, but even then it cannot unaided deliver distributional justice or equity. 
The concept of market completeness is extremely helpful in designing policies that 
attempt to remedy market failures, which are pervasive for environmental goods and in 
energy markets. Policies can also fail, as policy makers often lack the information 
necessary to make improving interventions, and it may be better to define property rights 
(e.g. in carbon emissions) and use auctions or markets to properly price these rights. 
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